But then, you could also say that Abhisit was making a virtue out of necessity.
The fact could be less of a black-and-white scenario. What is clear is that if the premier pre-empts this highly sensitive move, he could split his coalition - and that could undermine his own government's stability. The last thing Abhisit can afford now is to let this hot potato play into the hands of the opposition.
The amnesty move didn't come out of the blue. It was evident from the outset that Thaksin's nominees in Parliament would continue to find a way to absolve him from all the court verdicts - and, more importantly, to pave the way to block all pending cases against him.
To propose a bill that is too obvious an attempt to exonerate one person from all his sins would be too crude - not that all earlier efforts along these lines have been sophisticated or subtle, though.
That's why the new version of the bill has camouflaged wording to make it appear as if all politicians, of all shades, unfairly affected by the September 2006 coup would be free to engage in politics once again.
The side effect of this new exercise is, however, that the amnesty could benefit not only Thaksin and his cronies but also some of the key figures in Abhisit's current coalition. And that's the squall that could rock the government's boat severely enough to plunge it into a premature crisis.
The beneficiaries would include Banharn Silpa-archa and Newin Chidchob, both banned from politics for five years after the court found their respective parties guilty of breaking the law. More crucially for Abhisit, both of them represent significant pillars on which the coalition government stands.
The two veterans have made no official statement on the issue so far. But Interior Minister Chaovarat Charnveerakul, also the newly-named head of the Bhumjaithai Party - of which Newin is a major figure behind the scenes - has publicly spoken in favour of the bill.
Abhisit is in a dilemma: It's one thing to block Thaksin from making a comeback but it's another to be seen to deny his very own allies the opportunity to be granted the amnesty they feel they are entitled to.
What is Abhisit going to do now? He could adopt one of the following options:
1. Repeat his original position as the Democrat Party's leader on this issue. That is: strong opposition to any amnesty bill that is not part of a political reform process.
2. Play the game of political expediency and go along with the coalition partners' wishes in order to ensure his own survival for the next few months.
3. Employ a divide-and-rule strategy by rewriting the bill to separate Thaksin from the rest of the affected politicians.
4. Buy time. Make some general statements about political reform that would incorporate the amnesty clause. Show his generous attitude by allowing the Cabinet to debate the bill while resisting pressure from coalition partners.
For now, Abhisit has chosen the last option while emphasising the need to devote all government efforts to coping with the economic malaise rather than wasting time playing politics.
But deep down, he knows - and his opponents know - that when push comes to shove, the only path that lies ahead is a House dissolution to call a new election.
Since Abhisit is the only person who holds the constitutional power to decide when to resort to that last choice, he can afford to appear calm in the eye of an impending storm.
Who's afraid of a new election? Only those not qualified to run - and those scared of being caught cheating … again.
(Share your views on my blog at http://blog.nationmultimedia.com/thaitalk.)