Preah Vihear a case study in diplomatic mismanagement

Those who fully understood the content of the article still asked me to clarify the nature of the lessons learned. I am therefore writing about this story once again to summarise the lessons learned from my point of view.

The first lesson is that Cambodia handled this matter strategically with a firm and definite objective. The alterations were only in the action plan to achieve that objective. Meanwhile, the Thai side has reacted to Cambodia's actions offhandedly. Cambodia's position all along has been that it must file for Preah Vihear's listing as a world heritage site alone. Cambodia single-handedly realised that goal in the 2006 meeting of the World Heritage Committee.

In that bid, the French map was used and the area concerned did cover the overlapping zone on which some parts of Preah Vihear are situated. Had it not been for objections from the Thai side, the Cambodians would have proceeded with the inclusion of the area covered in the French map. Fortunately, the Thai side did voice its opposition before the 2007 meeting. The Cambodians knew quite well that the Thai side would not agree if they insisted on the French map since it would involve the demarcation line.

Therefore, the Cambodians introduced a new plan that recreated the history of Preah Vihear in order to cut off its connection with structures and components on Thai territory and sever its ties with ancient communities on the Thai side. This new version of history was prepared to convince the committee that the set of buildings originally built as the Preah Vihear Temple are all in Cambodia, and its connection was with the area at the foot of the mountain in the south, which is in Cambodia, and not in the north, which is in Thailand. This revised history appeared in the report prepared by Cambodia for the World Heritage Committee in its 31st meeting in 2007, and the French map was still included in the nomination file. The Thai representatives opposed both the map and the new version of history in that meeting as well as subsequent meetings.

The Cambodians, then, came up with reinforcements and some alterations to their plan, but still adhered to the primary strategic objective: filing a solo bid. They reinforced their plan by asking experts from various countries to confirm the new version of Preah Vihear history crafted by Cambodia in the report submitted at the 2007 meeting. They also altered the plan by reducing the area of land for the bid by limiting it to the area that the Thai side regards as Cambodian territory. They also went as far as to get the Thai government to go from actively protesting the solo bid to actively supporting it when the government of Thailand changed hands. Meanwhile, from the Thai side was only defensive.

There was not a systematic and continuous contingency plan to oppose the Cambodian side along its path to the strategic objective.

 The second lesson is that the operation on such an important and sensitive issue really needs unity and a continuity of command. Cambodia has empowered a deputy prime minister to handle this case from the beginning. He has led the negotiations in every meeting. But on the Thai side, many agencies have been involved: Treaties and Legal Affairs Department, the Foreign Minister, the Fine Arts Department, the Culture Ministry and the National Committee on World Heritage. There has not been a sole leader with full command over all agencies regarding this matter. As a consequence, there has not been a consolidated plan for all agencies to follow. Frequent political changes in Thailand have also contributed to the lack of continuity of policy.

 The third lesson is that while Cambodia successfully lobbied foreign partners over this matter, the Thai side seemed not to care much about seeking international support for our cause. We never explained clearly to the world that there was an attempt to distort fact about the history of the Temple. We have never gone out to secure help from eminent persons outside our country to oppose such a distortion of historical facts. There has not been a planned and systematic diplomatic response to oppose the distorted actions and viewpoints of certain foreign experts either directly or subtly to the countries to which those experts belong. There has not been an action to clearly show to the world that Prear Vihear should have been jointly listed by both countries and jointly managed as well. Also we have not made any moves to convince people in various factions within Unesco to prevent this biased movement.

The fourth lesson learned here is that the lack of a united command means the lack of a centre in which views can be exchanged. That is why we have been unable to comprehend that Cambodia's proposal may be the first step that the country takes to moving on for greater sovereignty over the management of Preah Vihear, including components and structures in the overlapping areas as well as those in Thailand, without having to move the borderline. This can be done through resolution No 14 approved by the World Heritage Committee in their 32nd meeting, which involves the management of the conservation area around the temple.

That is why I have proposed the formation of a national committee to take care of this matter so that we will not be trapped further by this game plan. This committee would enable us to look at the matter from all perspectives and will create a definite plan for all agencies to follow in the same direction. The committee will also attract the people needed to solve the problem, which must be done concurrently.