Both sides of the political divide must forget Thaksin

But Thai politicians seem to have invoked the rulebook for the destruction of their opponents.

In 76 years under democratic rule, the country has seen no less than 18 constitutional changes. If the People Power Party has its way, the 2007 Constitution will soon undergo an extensive rewrite.

With so many charters written and discarded, the writing of rules has, in effect, become a national pastime.

Rival camps try to sway public sentiment to justify their respective sets of rules. But the people have never been party to any debate about rules. The rulebook is for politicians to enforce and abide by and not for voters.

As voters, the people cast their ballots to elect their representatives who should play by the rules to do their jobs, but who instead choose to manipulate the rules to grab or cling to power.

The Thai political scene is unique in one respect - politicians often avoid policy debates like the plague but are quick to slap the rulebook against one another in order to gain the upper hand in a power struggle.

Ever since a group of about 227 elites switched from absolute monarchy to popular democracy under the banner of the People Party in 1932, rules have been written and revised to suit the powers that be.

In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the country saw many sets of game-changing rules as a ripple effect from the split within the People Party. The clique led by Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram took several decades to settle a score with rivals under the leadership of Pridi Phanomyong.

Popular votes and political parties were introduced more than a decade after the advent of democratic rule as a result of irreconcilable infighting within the People Party. Whenever members of the Thai ruling class could not work out a power-sharing arrangement, they would always try to outpace one another to gain control of the rules and invoke popular support as a shield in the game of our rules versus theirs.

As the country moved from the half-baked democracy of the 1980s to the full-fledged democratic rule of the 1990s, a few charters went into the rubbish bin of history as the ruling class remains unable to reach a consensus on suitable rules for the Thai political system.

For almost a decade, the 1997 constitution was heralded as the "ideal" road map of Thai politics. The 2006 coup-makers tore up the charter by citing the social divisions and the collapse of the checks and balances caused by the authoritarian leadership of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra.

The suspended 1997 charter was the model for the 2007 Constitution. As the charter was promulgated during the seizure of power, the People Power Party now says it is unacceptable. The main coalition party wants an extensive charter rewrite based on the suspended provisions.

It is ironic that many political veterans, including Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, have had a sudden change of heart - going from staunch opponents of the suspended 1997 charter to fully embracing it as a cure-all remedy.

Government politicians and their opponents have stirred up great confusion by making conflicting remarks on what the new rules should be. Thaksin is at the centre of the debate because both proponents and opponents of charter rewrite invoke his name in their arguments.

Samak and government politicians cry foul because the charter provisions have been designed to get rid of one man, Thaksin, with ramifications that weaken political parties. Opponents counter that the government is trying to fix the rules on Thaksin's behalf.

Rival sides have floated so many arguments for rules they see as just. But their arguments keep changing so as to make it difficult to anticipate what the new charter, if written, would look like. This is because the ruling class is citing rules as a pretext for the power struggle instead of making a genuine attempt to improve the political system.

The power struggle appears in many shapes and forms relating to the scenarios for charter revision, though the bottom line is that government politicians want to remain in power for a full term, while Thaksin's opponents are suspicious that he is making inroads to resume power.

The tension would dissipate if the government could convince opponents and the ruling class about its emancipation from Thaksin. The charter amendments are not the real issue but a bargaining chip for a power arrangement.

For public consumption, the charter rewrite has been dominating headlines as the key issue of the day. In the backrooms, intense negotiations are being carried out on the fate of Thaksin. For the political predicament to end, government politicians must realise they cannot afford to carry Thaksin as excess baggage.

The charter amendments will become clear if the backroom negotiations can be settled successfully. The fact of the matter is that Thaksin, his family members and cohorts can appeal for royal clemency at the end of the judicial review.

It is high time to stop involving Thaksin, directly or indirectly, in the political scene, otherwise this state of political misery will never be overcome.