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Published on December 27, 2007

In fact, the two instruments are deeply intertwined. The Charter further buttresses SEANWFZ's fresh remit in ensuring that members do not manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons, and only use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on their own territories (including their continental shelves and 200-mile economic exclusion zones), in line with Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.

Still, it is easy to gloss over the importance of this treaty and what it stands for. Firstly, the region's agenda in mitigating global terrorism, managing risks accompanying future environmental catastrophes, and securing a broad access to markets as a means toward collective growth, has the effect of pushing nuclear security issues into the periphery. Nevertheless, it is clear that counter nuclear-proliferation, safeguarding the civilian use of nuclear energy, and now nuclear terrorism, are critical issues on the global security agenda to which Asean and its Asia-Pacific partners can play a vital role.

Secondly, compared to the security dynamics in South and Northeast Asia, the nuclear weaponisation of a Southeast Asian state may seem highly implausible. Yet, the rush towards proliferation in other regions shows how easily the nuclear genie can find itself "un-bottling" within any state including those among and around Asean.

For example, India was initially a beneficiary of the US-sponsored "Atoms for Peace" programme in the 1950s offering civilian access to nuclear technology to countries pledging not to acquire weapons.

Yet, India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, demonstrating its capabilities despite justifying the explosion on peaceful grounds. Following subsequent tests in 1998, India formally declared itself a nuclear power, while the international community puzzled over how it had allowed this to come to pass.

Thus, while Burma's military junta made an assurance in May that the construction of its 10-megawat nuclear research reactor - to be built with Russian help and International Atomic Energy Agency supervision - is designed "in the interests of the people" and "not for the wrong purpose", such guarantees should be bound by as many agreements as possible.

These expectations similarly apply to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, whose proposed nuclear plants may or may not come into operation over the next decade. 

Wisely, the Action Plan has set out a series of important tasks between 2007 and 2012.  Firstly, it seeks to have Asean members completely accede to the IAEA safety agreements and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. It also intends to encourage members to consider acceding - as the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs press release put it - to other related international instruments such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Additional Protocol. Certainly some members may loath recognising the likelihood to which other members may turn to nuclear energy in powering their economies; never mind the seemingly lofty idea of a nuclear-test explosion within the zone. 

However, the Association would do well by going beyond just considering these agreements and signing them as soon as possible. By putting a cartful of conventions before the nuclear horse, Asean reinforces prevailing norms and standards of behaviour that serve to reduce the possibility of an infraction.

Secondly, the Plan seeks to forge an array of cooperative networks at the regional and international levels in improving nuclear safety, the early notification of accidents, and emergency preparedness and response plans to such catastrophes. This makes perfect sense in light of Asean's burgeoning risk-management ethos. 

Thirdly, but perhaps most importantly for now, the Plan seeks to continue "close consultations" to pursue the accession of the five recognised nuclear weapon states -China, France, Russia, the UK and the US - into signing and ratifying a supplementary protocol attached to SEANWFZ. These states, especially the US, continue to refrain from signing the protocol because it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft armed with nuclear weapons to have freedom of movement in the region's waters and airspace.

In addition, a provision in SEANWFZ provides a disincentive for such protocol ratification by permitting any member to decide whether a nuclear state's ships and aircraft may visit its territory. Recently, China indicated interest in signing the protocol. In a bid to encourage the US to follow suit, China stands to benefit from limiting US ability to manoeuvre nuclear forces in the region.

While Asean members continue to hedge between Chinese and American influence in the region, it serves the region's collective interest to avoid major stand-offs involving nuclear weapons. Indeed, Asean must strive for Chinese and American protocol ratification by 2012. In fact, there is no reason why it should not also consider creating a special protocol for India as an unofficial nuclear power.

Lastly, the SEANWFZ Commission must factor Australia as an important medium power affecting the future of the zone. In recent months an informal debate about renewing Australia's nuclear option in light of the current regional uncertainties was sparked by a pre-election essay published in October by the deputy director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. The debate revived largely forgotten memories of how successive coalition governments sought to acquire nuclear weapons between the 1950s and the 1970s in a bid to threaten targets in Sukarno's Indonesia. The Australian calculation directly responded to Sukarno's public vaunting of Indonesia's intention of acquiring nuclear weapons through Chinese assistance after the latter crossed the nuclear threshold in 1964.

Today, the players may have changed. However, realpolitik remains an inescapable state of affairs within Asean and the Asia-Pacific. In the face of ever increasing stakes, the Association must ensure that similar nuclear dilemmas do not manifest themselves.

Graham Gerard Ong-Webb

Graham Gerard Ong-Webb is a programme leader with the Nuclear Security and Missile Defence Programme at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies in the United Kingdom. He can be contacted at gerard.ong-webb@cdiss.net.