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Published on October 29, 2007

Successive Thai governments have for years failed to correctly gauge the internal situation in Burma and face up to the reality.

Following the first brutal crackdown on democratic forces in 1988, Thailand has taken it for granted that the Burmese junta would last forever and, worse, adopted the attitude that nothing can be done about it. Some even referred to historical experience and empathy that goes back over four centuries.

Unfortunately, over the past two decades Thailand has also become increasingly dependant on natural gas from Burma due to high local demand for electricity and the long-standing desire to diversify its energy sources. On top of that, the focus on economic security across the border has rendered Thailand toothless towards Burma.

Every time there is a response needed on Burma, Thai policy-makers, especially those in the Foreign Ministry, have been timid and said that Burma would not be affected by any policy approach or initiative, therefore it was essential to maintain the status quo through passive engagement with the Burmese junta.

These twin objectives have stymied effective Thai policy towards Burma. Thailand remained ambivalent even at the height of the military's brutal crackdown on monks last month, even though it was clear the internal situation in Burma was worsening. Bangkok failed to make its voice heard. The most ridiculous views expressed on the issue have come from Thai military leaders regarding the Burmese military's actions.

As Bangkok comes to grips with the Burmese reality, three areas of consensus have emerged within the region and the international community. First, there is a strong sense of revulsion towards the use of lethal weapons against monks. Second, a peaceful transition and national reconciliation are desired - not a regime change. Lastly, the UN is seen as the only appropriate body for dealing with the Burmese crisis.

By taking the lead in the effort, the UN is helping to underscore the point that the Burmese crisis is no longer an internal issue, a contention the junta and many countries have argued and supported, and does have direct repercussions on security and stability in the region. In fact, Thailand has been the country most affected by political oppression inside Burma.

Thailand still entertains the idea that it can balance its national interests with growing international pressure. Senior officials from the Foreign Ministry and the country's security apparatus argue that keeping the Thailand-Burma border free of trouble is their top priority. Some of them even credited the Burmese side for maintaining border trade and a business-as-usual attitude over the past month. They pointed out that this time Rangoon's leaders did not shut down trade at the border as they have done in the past.

Such rationalising automatically kept the officials dealing with Burma from taking any initiative or thinking outside the box. Since 2001 this approach has become a self-fulfilling prophecy due to the government's strong support of the Burmese region. In addition, vested personal interests, epitomised by those of deposed premier Thaksin Shinawatra and his business empire which ironically still continue today, have prevented them from formulating foreign policy that would general genuinely serve the national interest.

The biggest disappointment has come from Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, who has not heeded the international outcry for concrete action. Following Asean's statement condemning the Burmese junta for using lethal weapons against monks and civilians, the premier had the audacity to write a letter to General Than Shwe expressing solidarity with him and stressing that he was speaking as one soldier to another. That was a shameful gesture from a leader who claims to be democratic. Such hypocrisy at the personal level has further hampered Thai diplomacy on Burma.

Without a clear position from Thailand, other Asean countries have tried to take charge in their own way. Singapore, as the Asean chair, was more vocal than others for obvious reasons. In the context of Asean diplomacy, the absence of a clear position from a frontline state means the grouping cannot do much.

The saddest part is that the Foreign Ministry seems to be fixated on the belief that Thailand's policy on Burma can never be changed even though there is a marked change in the international context. Countries such as Japan, Australia and particularly China were far more pragmatic as they incrementally shifted their positions on Burma to be more in tune with international sentiment.

It is inevitable that in the weeks and months ahead there will be more specific financial and banking sanctions, which will affect Thailand's economic ties with Burma. By then it will be too late for Thailand to come up with any policy initiative that will mitigate a negative outcome.

Eventually the Thai people and the government will have to explain why they did not pay any attention to the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people. This could be sooner rather than later.

Kavi Chongkittavorn