Negotiating with leaders of the old separatist groups will be easy. Virtually all of these old leaders have given up any hope of separating Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces by force to create a Muslim Malay homeland. Indeed, military officers and leaders of the old separatist groups have been in constant contact for many years, exchanging ideas on how to win the hearts and minds of Muslim Thais of Malay descent. But it will be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate peace with the currently active Islamic militants/Malay separatists. These people are openly challenging the authority of the Thai state with a full-fledged insurgency. The situation is tantamount to war and they have no compunction about killing innocent people, either Muslim or Buddhist. They have established a reign of fear. One of the problems for the security forces is that these elusive insurgent groups usually do not burden themselves with central command and control structures.

Seeking to negotiate with these murderous insurgents will prove futile and counter-productive. They have no incentive to come to the negotiating table because they have been allowed to launch attacks on the security forces and slaughter innocent civilians virtually unopposed by the Thai armed forces and law enforcement officials.

In the absence of effective military strategies and tactics, the bulk of the 40,000-strong security force is being kept inside their fortified barracks. Only a small number are dispatched to guard urban centres, government offices and schools. It becomes obvious that the official policy is to avoid confronting the insurgents partly through fear of causing civilian casualties but more probably because of a lack of good intelligence with which to track down insurgents who live among the civilian population.

Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and junta chief Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin are also hampered by their poor judgement and lack of diplomatic experience. The thinking of Thailand's military leaders is that the insurgents are trying to persuade the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to throw its weight behind them. If the insurgents succeed, the OIC could take their case to the UN, which in turn could pressure Thailand to hold a referendum in the deep South to decide whether the people there should have the right to govern themselves. The UN saw what happened in East Timor and is concerned that Thailand's deep South could go the same route. This reflects the shallowness of Thailand's leaders' understanding of international politics and how the UN operates.

The previous generation of separatist groups, for example, had established offices in Middle Eastern countries. Pulo and the BRN sent more than 3,000 fighters to undergo training in Libya and Syria while their leaders sipped tea in Cairo, Mecca and Damascus. Yet, all of their networking activities failed to even get them a seat at the OIC. 

Moreover, the Thai government has grossly overrated the OIC. This is an organisation with little moral authority. Just look at the mess in Darfur and the general problems within the Muslim world. What is the OIC doing about any of this, other then issuing an endless stream of statements? Thailand will eventually wake up to the fact that a favourable statement issued by the OIC earlier this month will not bring peace to the South. Neither will the offer to negotiate with insurgents bring any cease-fire. Unless the government and security forces succeed in protecting civilians and effectively combating insurgents, peace will remain elusive, and the country's national security and territorial integrity will be compromised.