Why is this? The answer is trust. The interim leadership has long been crippled by a major disadvantage - their widely perceived illegitimate status. It has caused them many problems. The government's awkward attempts to fight off currency threats and to solve long-standing issues regarding foreign businesses ended in the regime being seen as trying too hard to implement the sufficiency economy theory without looking at the reality of the situation. But while Surayud and the CNS can lament this lack of trust as somewhat unfair, they have only themselves to blame for not trying to reverse the situation. Trust can only be gained, not demanded.

 Take the Somkid issue for example. His appointment as envoy for the sufficiency economy theory immediately sparked rumours of a "Sammakhitham-style" grand plan to hold on to power. Critics were reminded of the ironic political realignment in the wake of the 1991 coup that toppled the government of Chatichai Choonhavan. At that time, the military junta covertly joined hands with politicians whom they had publicly denounced. With backing from those politicians, junta leader Suchinda Kraprayoon became prime minister after a general election in early 1992, and the rest was history.

 Even as the interim leaders and Somkid are licking their wounds now, the rumours that Thaksin's former right-hand man was offered the controversial job because the military-backed regime wanted to groom him as a prime ministerial candidate after the next election have refused to go away. And this is partly because the interim leaders, Surayud included, have done little to quash such rumours.

 It's matters like this that have aggravated the crisis of confidence undermining the interim leaders. They can commit administrative mistakes, but they don't have the luxury of making political errors. And no political error is worse than an action seen as part of a scheme to extend their stay, directly or indirectly. Any move that can be taken as the slightest sign that they want to hold on to power, or want to dictate political developments once Thailand has a new constitution, will eat into their credibility, which has been shaky from day one.

 And no goodwill measures can cushion such political mistakes. There was strong opposition to Somkid not only because he had served Thaksin, but also because people didn't trust that the appointment was only about the sufficiency economy theory. Why was there such mistrust? Because the interim leaders themselves have roused suspicion, especially when it comes to the political reform process.

 The uproar against Somkid only served to confirm what the interim leaders should have known from the very beginning: the little resistance they faced in staging the September 19 coup does not mean that Thais don't want full democracy back as soon as possible. Somkid had to bow out eventually not only because of his links with Thaksin, but also because of suspected links between him and the interim regime.

 What Thai people want is simple: a good, democratic constitution, one based on the 1997 charter that had to be abolished because of the coup, followed by a fair and clean election so that the country can move on. Every sign that the country is moving toward these two goals will be welcomed. Any move that sows seeds of doubt in the minds of the public suggesting that these two goals may be compromised will always be taken very seriously. It would be a big mistake for the interim leaders to assume that the Thai public does not need daily assurances that the country is on the road back to a full democracy. On the contrary, such assurances must be supported by sincere actions. The Somkid mishap will be forgiven only if other political developments confirm that it was nothing more than a well-intentioned plan that went wrong.