The host country explained there was a typhoon approaching. Another report claimed the US, UK and Australia had warned of a possible terrorist attack. A third explanation suggested President Gloria Arroyo did not dare leave Manila.

This little incident can be read as richly symbolic. Is the idea of East Asian regional cooperation so flimsy it can be blown away by the wind? Or is the real threat coming from the US (and its allies)? Or is the main barrier the frailty of the region's own leaders?

The idea of an East Asia Community is the most ambitious proposal for an Asian regional grouping to date. The idea gelled when two wildly different trends in regional affairs suddenly interlocked.

The first came from Southeast Asia. In the 1997 financial crisis, countries found that the old US godfather was not interested to help. They began to think about forms of regional cooperation such as reserve swaps to ward off future crises. But there was a problem. A bunch of tiddly economies pooling their reserves does not add up to much in the context of today's massive financial flows. The Southeast Asian countries needed some big friends with really chunky reserves - like China, Korea, and Japan.

The second trend came from Northeast Asia. The re-emergence of China onto the world stage created a totally new strategic map. Countries needed a forum for talking to one another. But relations among China, Korea and Japan were so fraught with memories of historical conflict that direct relations were difficult. They needed some little, unthreatening friends to act as intermediaries.

When these two needs interlocked, things happened very fast. The resulting alignment was dubbed "Asean plus three" (three equals China, Japan and Korea) which nicely captured its double-headed form. Between 1999 and 2001, busy 'regiocrats' put together a skein of currency swap arrangements, plans for free trade agreements, an Asian bond market, a commitment to hold an annual East Asia Summit and the skeletal framework for an East Asia Community.

China was the biggest enthusiast. In the early 2000s, China launched a load of FTAs, early harvest schemes and cooperation arrangements to create more space for its economic growth. The EAC was just one trial balloon in a sky-full. But the backing from a country of this scale meant the EAC had more momentum than countless other fantasies of regional cooperation over previous years.

But support from China guaranteed opposition from the US. In 1998-99, the US had ruthlessly crushed the proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund. In 2001, a US government study listed such financial cooperation in Asia as one of the ten biggest threats to the US position in the world. A little over a year ago, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said: "The future of Asia and the Pacific community will be defined around two great themes - openness and choice. Instead of closed societies or economies, instead of spheres of influence, we stand for an open world. Instead of an exclusive club of powers, we stand for a community open to all. But states must choose."

In other words, the US will support an East Asia Community so open that even green aliens from Mars can join. Such a community would of course be incapable of any collective action. Shorn of diplomatic nicety, this speech says, "Don't you dare!"

This US opposition created difficulties for Asian states that have to listen to the US. No single Asean leader has come forward as a cheerleader for an EAC. Japan welcomed the EAC because Japanese businessmen hope to break down economic barriers inside Asia, and Japan's diplomats rushed to take a leadership role in the EAC to pre-empt China from dominating the process. But Japan was nervous about offending the US. Finally it came up with the solution of expanding the list of countries in the EAC to include three prominent US allies - Australia, New Zealand and India. The resulting triple-header was dubbed "Asean plus three, plus three".

Of course, a three-headed animal has even less chance of moving purposefully than a two-headed one. Over the last three years, the EAC idea tended to drift. The first East Asian Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, and based on the "Asean plus three, plus three" grouping, was so complicated by internal sensitivities that this grand meeting lasted only three hours and passed resolutions of stunning vapidity. The fact that this summit's successor was blown away by the wind seems totally fitting. The EAC seemed securely on the way to the graveyard of acronyms.

But maybe not. The summit has been reconvened for January, when at least the meteorological typhoons are sure to be over. The meeting comes at a time when the fall of the US dollar focuses attention on the seismic implications of the collapse of American financial power.

For years, the US has lived beyond its means, and other countries have propped it up by buying dollars. These countries could use that money better at home, but in the short term need to support the US as a market for their exports. The US uses the funds for military adventurism in the Middle East, which is undermining its effectiveness as a security policeman in Asia.

The biggest holders of these dollars are China and Japan. The question is not if the dollar collapses, but when. The deciding factor is not the size of the US deficit, but China's self-confidence and China-Japan relations. The problems caused by the dollar's recent fall, including Thailand's panicky and disastrous essay in capital controls, hint at how rough the transition will be. Major powers in East Asia will need a framework of cooperation to manage the massive tensions unleashed by a dollar collapse, and to prepare for regional economic growth and security in the aftermath.

The EAC floated up in one financial crisis, and could take shape in the next.

Chang Noi