The armed forces complained about major shortfalls in budgetary allocations during the five and a half years of the Thaksin administration. They say this adversely affected plans to upgrade weapons systems and compromised their fighting capability. If this were true, the injection of funds into the Army, Navy and Air Force would result in an improvement in performance commensurate with the additional resources.

But military chiefs know full well that the size of the defence budget alone does not explain the general lack of battle-readiness and sagging morale among the rank and file of the armed forces. For too long the military has been weighed down by debilitating structural problems, lack of professionalism and corruption.

All of these problems, which have been allowed to fester, combine to produce a poor performance on the part of the armed forces. This below-par performance has persisted for almost three years since the three southernmost provinces were turned into a battlefield in which more than 1,800 people have been killed.

It is impossible to ignore the utter failure of the armed forces to achieve the objectives they set out to do: suppress the insurgency, protect the civilian population and restore peace in the strife-torn region. Tens of thousands of troops have been dispatched to the three provinces but most of them simply while away their time in the safety of their barracks while only small contingents are sent out on daily patrols - thus becoming easy prey for insurgents.

The insurgents have learned how to use hit-and-run tactics to their advantage because they know the security forces dare not pursue them into the villages and communities where they hide and plot their next attacks surrounded by sympathisers or fearful civilians.

In the meantime, the insurgents have continually improved and refined their guerrilla tactics. They now have the capability to launch near-simultaneous attacks in up to 80 locations at a time in one or all three provinces. The military routinely fails even to provide adequate protection for its own forces or to dispatch timely reinforcements in aid of comrades who lay dying after roadside ambushes.

It comes as no surprise that the armed forces' effort to win the hearts and minds of people in the deep South is not working. A military that is incapable of protecting its own soldiers does not inspire confidence in local people, who then refuse to cooperate in any way with the authorities for fear of reprisal by ruthless insurgents. Without cooperation from local people, the armed forces gain no intelligence with which to effectively battle the guerrillas.

If the Thai public never had high expectations of its armed forces to begin with, perhaps it should now.

Lacking funds is the least of the problems compared to the bloated bureaucracy that the armed forces have become. Between them, the Army, Navy and Air Force have hundreds of desk-bound generals, admirals and air marshals who have no real job to do. Such a top-heavy structure explains why the military is spending up to 60-70 per cent of its total budget on salaries, leaving little to upgrade weapon systems or to maintain a high level of battle-readiness.

The 300,000-strong military must shed personnel to become a leaner, more effective professional fighting force suitable for ever-changing national security requirements.

Corruption in the forces continues to be a serious issue because of a lack of transparency in the arms procurement process and in day-to-day administration. Without thorough reform, the armed forces will collapse under their own weight. The September 19 coup notwithstanding, the Surayud government and military leaders owe it to the public to implement the badly needed reforms. And the National Legislative Assembly must make sure the additional funds for the armed forces is conditional to their measurable improvement in performance.