Moreover, it was not even clear how the withdrawal of US forces could improve security. An exit strategy for US troops will be more difficult given the fact that it must be done amid mounting pressure from the restless and sceptical American public.

At this stage it is unlikely that any downsizing of the US military presence will translate into greater security on the ground. Left to their own devices, the Iraqi government and its fledgling armed forces will not be able to stop the rival militias from infiltrating government offices and engaging in sectarian violence. Such a threat has the potential to tear the country apart.

Prime Minister al-Maliki will have to go beyond his vague promises to rein in these militias. It remains to be seen if he is simply refusing to take steps to curb the militias' influence or whether he lacks the wherewithal to do so. But for the time being, according to President Bush anyway, al-Maliki is "the right guy for Iraq" - at least for now.

From the start, the Iraqi premier has been held hostage by Shi'ite politicians. The Shi'ites could certainly do more in terms of reconciling with the minorities and less on driving a wedge between themselves and the Sunnis.

Al-Maliki's authority has also been undermined by Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical and influential Shi'ite cleric, who maintains a formidable private army. Al-Sadr wants a complete withdrawal of the US and other foreign forces as soon as possible. The al-Sadr militia had fought fierce battles against American and allied forces until it was beaten and forced to agree to a cease-fire. Bush wants al-Maliki to distance himself and reduce his reliance on the support of the al-Sadr faction, but the Iraqi premier continues to side-step the question about whether, or how he will actually do so.

"My coalition is not only with one entity," the prime minister said. "Mr Sadr and the Sadrists are just one component that participates in the parliament."

The 30-strong Sadrist bloc has suspended its support for al-Maliki's ruling coalition and withdrawn six ministers from the Cabinet in protest at the premier's meeting with Bush.

The Bush administration hopes to calm Iraq in part by getting Sunni insurgent sympathisers into negotiations with al-Maliki's Shi'ite-led government. It has pushed its Sunni allies like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to take the lead in mediating the discussions.

While the participation of the neighbouring Sunni allies may be a good starting point, one should not overlook the possibility that if things go wrong, such a push could be perceived as the start of a region-wide Sunni-Shi'ite confrontation. All parties involved must exercise caution. They must not be seen to be meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. After all, Iraq, as a state comprising Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds, must be given a chance to sort out its own problems.

Taking sides at this critical juncture could also be harmful. Any further escalation of the Shi'ite-Sunni confrontation could lead to the inexorable march towards all-out civil war. This would be disastrous for Iraq and could also be dangerous for the entire Middle East. Iraq must come up with a meaningful political compromise between the Shi'ite and Sunni factions if a civil war is to be averted.

While it may be neck-deep in domestic troubles, Baghdad must take the sensible approach to resolve the internal strife and not allow the country to fall victim to Iran's hegemonic ambition or become a breeding ground for al-Qaeda terrorists.

Al-Maliki has given assurances that he is ready to cooperate with all neighbouring countries that wish to work with his national unity government on the basis of non-interference. Let's hope that Iraq, with the help of the international community, will be strong enough to resist interference from its neighbours as the US and Allied forces begin to scale down their presence.