He must have been surprised that one of his rather innocuous suggestions has sparked an unexpected and heated debate among politicians and academics alike: judging from the havoc wrought by Thaksin Shinawatra and his cronies, shouldn't there be a two-term limit for politicians?

At almost the same time, another renowned political scientist, Dr Amorn Chandrasomboon, fired a salvo from another direction. The new constitution, he suggested, as part of a package of political reform, should stipulate that the next prime minister be selected by a majority vote in parliament - but he or she doesn't have to be from among the ranks of elected MPs.

Responses from politicians were prompt and vehement. "That's nothing but the outgrowth of a technocrat's mentality," declared Thai Rak Thai's acting chairman Chaturon Chaisaeng. "Thirapat's proposal reflects a bureaucrat's way of thinking. They lack proper understanding of the right kind of political system. They simply don't appreciate the fact that democratic countries don't limit the terms of public-office holders." Chaturon no doubt represents the conventional thinking among the current breed of Thai politicians.

Limiting terms is basically undemocratic, the political mainstream screamed. Why can't good and qualified politicians serve as long as the people are willing to vote them back into office? Placing a limit on the term of office isn't going to prevent the abuse of power. Corrupt politicians, they argue, can always put their "nominees" in office, even if they themselves can't legally occupy any position of influence anyway.

The argument of the pro term-limit camp is fundamentally based on the fear of undesirable elements and corrupt influence taking root. Anek Laothammathat, an academic turned party leader, is in favour of a limit for a very practical reason: it could even prevent future coups. That sounds somewhat weird, doesn't it? But pragmatism is what counts, he argues.

Anek said in a separate interview: "If it's clear that nobody can be prime minister for more than two four-year terms, then even if everyone is fed up, they know that a hated premier wouldn't last forever. They would know when he had to go. That means they wouldn't have to think of asking the military to intervene if they couldn't stand a particular prime minister anymore."

If the question of term-limit has triggered a storm of verbal exchange, wait until the real time-bombs are detonated. Already, some students of politics have come up with a list of even more controversial amendments to the previous constitution - considered one of the most democratic so far but torn up after the  coup.

Thaksin found ways to circumvent even the most liberal provisions in the previous charter. With 377 out of 500 MPs under his control, he was effectively untouchable and unaffected by the check-and-balance clauses in the constitution. Don't be surprised therefore if one of the major proposals up for consideration by the new constitution-drafting committee is to make it easier to move a no-confidence debate against the prime minister and the Cabinet.

The requirement of a minimum of two-fifths of the House members to subject the premier to a censure debate will have to come down to perhaps one-fourth, while one-fifth of the Lower House's MPs should suffice to call for a no-confidence motion against the other members of the Cabinet.

Another hot issue that will come up for debate will be a suggestion to dispense with the requirement to have all MPs be attached to a political party.

Thaksin's iron-fisted control over his party members has brought about the desire for more "flexible" rules over party affiliation. Advocates of this line of thinking will argue that since no political parties in the past (or even in the near future) could claim to genuinely represent the masses, the retention of the clause to force all MPs to belong to a party would raise the spectre of someone like Thaksin running the party as his personal business concern, with MPs effectively being treated as employees serving at the whim of the chief executive officer.

The list of proposed amendments will be long and controversial. The arguments for and against the proposed changes will only produce a sense of déjà vu.

None of these proposals is really new or ground-breaking. We will witness the repeat of an old exercise. The gist of the debate won't change much. Only the personalities are different this time.

In the end, there is no escaping the fact that the more things change, the more they remain the same. Inevitably there is a lurking fear that, as we prepare ourselves for the upcoming heated exchange on the new rules of the game, we may end up with this conclusion: perhaps it's not the rules that were bad, perhaps it is corrupt people exploiting a reasonably good set of rules from the outset.

Just a gentle reminder - lest we get on the wrong bus that doesn't take us where we really want to go.

Suthichai Yoon