Checkpoints have been set up to keep a close watch on buses and vans transporting villagers from the North and Northeast to stage a demonstration at Sanam Luang after the government lifted the ban on political gatherings of more than five people.

Key Thai Rak Thai Party members' livelihoods and well-being are in a precarious situation now that investigations into corruption and misdeeds are in full swing. Thaksin's family members stand to lose a fortune in back-tax payments and other penalties as a result of various allegations related to graft and abuse of power.

The only possible way to escape prosecution and punishment for their crimes is to stir up as much trouble as possible for the government and its guardian, the military junta. The easiest way is to organise paid mobs from upcountry to stage rallies in Bangkok and make headlines.

So far, there have been only small groups gathering at Sanam Luang due to lack of public support and the dubious background of those who move against the current government. Many Thaksin cronies are well heeled and can afford to invest a small part of their fortunes in creating big trouble for the government, especially considering the massive amounts they stand to lose if proof can be established that these were acquired through illegal means.

What the organisers of anti-government mobs intend to achieve is a quick ground swell of grass-roots discontent over the fact that they no longer have access to goodies and hand-outs under the populist programmes championed by Thaksin at taxpayer expense to win elections.

Though the chance of them succeeding is pretty remote right now, it cannot be totally ruled out as long as the CNS and Surayud government have yet to come up with some tangible achievements following the September 19 coup. At the least, what Thaksin's cronies hope to do is create headaches for those in power and discredit them for not being able to subdue anti-government moves.

The government's successes are keeping pace with the troublemaking by grass-roots mob organisers. Once there is gap, with the latter gaining headway, it could lead to growing scepticism among urban residents and a rapid decline in the popularity of the current powers from their peak in the days right after the coup.

There is an irony here. Both supporters and opponents almost share common ground in blaming the government and the CNS. The supporters are impatient with the slow action on asset investigations and lack of legal action against politicians for their villainous role during the peak of Thaksin's popularity. They criticise the double standard of the police force, which is still loyal to Thaksin and falling short of the public's expectations. They are deeply disappointed with the chief of police, who promoted Thaksin's cronies instead of punishing them for abuse of power and harassment of pro-democracy movements. They fear that if there is no longer broad-based support from urban people, the CNS and the government will find it increasingly hard to justify their presence.

To Thaksin supporters, whatever the CNS and the government have done is all wrong. They demand the restoration of democracy and elections while ignoring the fact that pro-democracy activists lived in danger under Thaksin's administration due to harassment and abusive practices. This group believes that cash-strapped rural people can be easily swayed and motivated to present their demands to the government, especially when financial inducement is used on those poor souls to maximum effect.

The noise of these people at rallies might not be powerful enough to draw strong attention but does nonetheless have a worrisome psychological impact by creating the perception that the government is slow to act and lacks political will to deal with pressing crises. It does not matter whether these are paid hecklers or just country folk brought on a tour of Bangkok whilst at the same time being politically useful to their paymaster.

If there is no continuing financial support, such paid mob rallies can be shrugged off, but there is still the criticism from some academics that regard the coup as undemocratic. In their view, change of government must be done through the democratic process, including general elections for the people to decide their own future.

When pressed hard, these academics did not come up with any lucid idea of how to get rid of Thaksin and his graft-infested administration. No matter how many elections are staged, the winners are always the champions of big-money politics. Thaksin understands this better than anyone else, because the money from fund donors and cronies produced the desired results.

Will the CNS and the government maintain the status quo in the current undeclared mass war? They have the advantage of being in power, though resources such as the state-owned media apparatus have not been utilised to the full extent. Their weak point is the lack of active cooperation on the part of the police force, making it necessary for them to keep martial law to discourage undercurrent movements, and thereby being exposed to international criticism.

If the CNS and the Surayud government want to contain or end subversive movements, the ongoing asset investigations must produce results beyond reasonable doubt, thus turning corrupt politicians into convicts and keeping them out of the public sight for years.

 Sopon Onkgara