What sort of love was intended: affectionate? familial? sentimental? spiritual? Or carnal love? I concluded by suggesting Thais should tighten their chastity belts and watch their backs lest Thaksin have some highly improper games in mind.

Thaksin, alas, turned my questions into prophecy by proceeding to diddle the nation from top to bottom. He diddled the bureaucracy, police, state media, independent agencies and democracy itself.  He diddled the Muslim South into renewed insurgency and tried to diddle the rural masses into becoming his power base against his urban opponents, thus fomenting violence and confrontation. In a final grab for absolute power he attempted to diddle the armed forces by appointing his cronies to key positions. This brought about a wholly predictable and appropriate response: tanks rolled.

 The night of September 19 was, for people watching TV, like the morning of September 11, 2001 (night-time here) when viewers called relatives and friends to see the events on screen. What was going on? In our case a coup was obviously taking place. But who was behind it? The forces of light or of darkness?

It gradually became clear that senior conservative officers had pre-empted an attempt by Thaksin to gain control of the armed forces by "quasi-legitimate" means. This was unacceptable either to the the establishment or to a majority of thinking Thais who had recognised how Thaksin had perverted democracy and legalised institutionalised corruption, reducing the economy to a national pyramid scheme for personal benefit. He had brought Thailand close to becoming a failed state.

In retrospect I am fascinated by how Thaksin mesmerised the nation for over five years by means of both popularism and fear. It is easy to see how at first this successful entrepreneur won the confidence of urban voters shaken by the economic collapse of 1997, and captured the rural masses with hand-outs, promises and theatre. But how did he gain near total control over state agencies, in particular broadcast media? And finally, how did he convince urban Thais he had them in his grip, the cities surrounded (Maoist style) by "Thaksinist" peasant armies?

These are questions that may occupy political scientists and sociologists for decades. But there remains a further question for psychiatrists: namely, how did this potentially brilliant leader turn himself in a tyrannous monster within five years? Biographers may search his childhood for answers to this mystery.

In general (I think) Thailand heaved a huge sigh of relief when the coup came. After five years of monkey business and one of severe tension, order had been restored. It is not that flowers bloomed and birds sang, but one could wake up without fear of what new crime or idiocy Thaksin might have perpetrated.

The reaction of the Western press was a result of ignorance; they had no way of knowing what had been going on here. Bush and Condoleezza Rice spouted the usual pious drivel about democracy, as though it were a perfect, divinely sanctioned system rather than a fallible attempt to get things more-or-less right.

The local reaction was various. While some respected thinkers welcomed the coup, others remained silent, and a large minority of academics condemned it out of hand. They depicted it as a dangerous regression to the paternalism and authoritarianism of the past that can no longer work in a modern society; Thai society should be mature enough to conduct its affairs rationally, without resorting to the "Daddy power" of the military and the palace. I couldn't agree more, but could intellectuals have removed Thaksin by civic means? I rather think not.

Thailand's main social and political problem is that it has a highly developed vertical structure (government from the top down), while its horizontal structures (people-to-people civic organisations) remain stunted. This was historically determined by Thailand's reaction successively to colonialism, fascism and the Cold War when the strong state took precedence over civic society.

Vertical structure is essential to any state, and is virtuous when derived from popular consent; it becomes vicious only when it is enforced against the public's will. The excellent character of the coup-makers (in contrast with the regime they replaced) has prompted many Thais to welcome the coup as a liberation instead of resenting it as a violation.

I do not have my finger on the rural pulse, but imagine that many country folk welcomed the coup. Their enthusiasms tend to be short-lived, as when a politician comes with promises and hand-outs; they then return to the difficult task of making ends meet. Thaksin may have appeared in their sky as an auspicious star, but when the coup took place and Thaksin disappeared from the TV screen they may well have felt relief at the drop in tension and return to "normality", allowing them to get on with their daily lives.

Am I a monster of conservatism? So are many peasants. Our coup may be regrettable in theory, but under the circumstances it was permissible and laudable. If it was a step backward, it was a step back from the abyss of state-sponsored anarchy. The coup was carried out by intelligent men of integrity and saved Thailand from the possibility of civil breakdown. I am a little impatient with academics who oppose the coup, though I honour their high principles. Could they, with their wisdom and righteousness, have put an end to Thaksin's pestilential regime? Intellectuals worked bravely to expose and weaken the monster, but it took the Army to deliver a timely, decisive blow.

It remains to be seen whether the new regime, having consigned Thaksinism to the cesspit of history, will live up to its bright promise and heartfelt welcome. Or whether it, too, will slide down the slope into similar infamy. Fans of "Lord of the Rings" will note how the Ring of Power can turn men of honour into fiends.

Though idealistic proponents of democracy may disapprove of the coup, it has done away with a regime of sophisticated thieves, crafty propagandists and legally sanctioned thugs. It has given us another chance to turn our minds, again, to the task of setting up a democracy that works, together with a more equitable, responsive and inclusive social order.

The burning question in many Thai minds today is not "How to prevent military intervention?" but "How to ensure democracy will never again be hijacked by scoundrels posing as champions of the people?" Perhaps I really am a rotten old elitist. If Attila the Hun had staged this coup and given Thaksin the boot, I would have kissed him on both cheeks (Attila, not Thaksin).

Michael Wright is an authority on Thai history.

Michael Wright

Special to The Nation

Bangkok