Although the interim government has been in power for only a few weeks, most of the key players, including Council for National Security chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin, are considered old hands in the effort to quell the insurgency. Because of this, the government cannot claim to be a bunch of neophytes who need time to get up to speed on the long-standing political, economic and social problems that have kept the insurgency alive and the ongoing military measures to put down the rebellion.

Much has been made about the deposed Thaksin government's mishandling of the strife-torn provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, which only exacerbated the situation and caused further radicalisation of Muslim people of Malay descent. These people feel victimised by past state-sanctioned discrimination and even today continue to feel they are marginalised by the rest of Thai society.

Ideas have been broached on ways to bring about national reconciliation, rebuild mutual trust and make amends for past wrongs, but all of these well-intentioned proposals have been held back and remain unimplemented, because of a failure by the state security apparatus to battle the insurgents effectively and bring back even a semblance of law and order, let alone any attempt to win the hearts and minds of the local population.

Local people huddle in fear for their lives, because they have been intimidated by insurgents who move freely in their midst. The armed forces and police have been reluctant to engage the rebels militarily for fear of causing civilian casualties. Muslims who cooperate with the authorities in the fight against the insurgency are targeted for assassination alongside innocent Buddhists, who are randomly marked out for murders on a daily basis.

In other words, peace-loving, moderate Muslims in the three provinces are being held hostage by ruthless extremists. All the while, Army outposts are attacked and armed-forces personnel and police ambushed while on patrol with increasing frequency.

Lack of intelligence-gathering capability by the security agencies has been identified as a major problem since the violence broke out, but there has been no marked improvement in this area. Which explains why Army and police personnel continue to be sitting ducks in the escalating conflict.

The authorities do not even seem to know how the insurgents have been able to replenish their large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition - or who supplies them and through what routes.

For the past few weeks since Mahathir took the initiative to "mediate" between the Thai authorities and the insurgents, the Surayud government has been reluctant to commit one way or another. There is uncertainty about whether formally to accept the offer made by the former Malaysian leader, who is at odds with the current Malaysian government led by Abdullah Badawi, with whom Thailand seeks to improve bilateral ties damaged by Thaksin's aggressive diplomacy.

Diplomatic considerations aside, the decision whether to enter into talks with the insurgents is a tricky one, because it raises the questions of whether it is appropriate to be seeking talks under fire and who the insurgents are supposed to represent. Surely the Surayud government will want to enter any such negotiations from a position of strength, not weakness, and certainly not out of desperation. But first it must come up with a coherent strategy to make sure the war against the insurgents is winnable and peace in the deep South achievable.