The computer analogy may be useful to a certain extent in helping people make sense of what is happening to our democracy, but it doesn't begin to explain the complicated charter-drafting process and many pitfalls that the soon-to-be-established Constitution Drafting Assembly must avoid.

It is encouraging to see the enthusiastic response from members of academia and political activists, who provided valuable suggestions on the organisation of the Constitution Drafting Assembly as well as specific provisions that should be included in the new charter. This is all well and good. But the drafters of the new constitution must also learn from the mistakes of the framers of the previous one, particularly their tendency to underestimate anti-reform forces and failure to take into consideration the realities of the country's political culture, which is still firmly rooted in the corruption-prone patronage system.

The now-defunct constitution of 1997 - widely known as the "People's Charter" because of its idealistic aspirations and the high degree of public participation that went into its drafting - was once touted as the crowning achievement of the reform movement. In a way it was an important achievement of reformists - comprising intellectuals, business leaders, social activists, politicians and bureaucrats, who spontaneously came together to push an idealistic, progressive agenda.

At the time the 1997 charter was drafted, the 1991 military coup by the National Peace-keeping Council that toppled the Chatichai government, widely perceived to be corrupt, and the bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protesters the following year was still fresh in the public's memory. Everybody thought the idealistic constitution - which envisioned sweeping political reform to transform the administrative, legislative and judicial branches of government into more responsive, transparent and accountable democratic institutions - would put Thailand firmly on the path towards a fuller and participatory democracy that served all its people better.

The ultimate goal of the 1997 constitution was to bring about a rules-based political system characterised by smooth functioning of the three branches of government, relatively free from corruption. The constitution laid the groundwork for this, including the creation of several independent bodies to monitor the performance of the government and ensure checks and balances among its three branches to achieve the greatest public good and eliminate corruption. It was supposed to put an end to military coups for good by seeking to eradicate corruption, which was always used as justification for a military takeover.

It did not work. Less than four years after the 1997 charter was promulgated, Thaksin burst onto the political centre-stage with an ingenious combination of political patronage, outright vote-buying and populist policies that pandered to the masses. Once he achieved power, Thaksin went on to subvert the checks-and-balances mechanism, to buy the loyalty of much of the civil-society movement and the mass media, and intimidate those people that his money could not sway. Corruption was rampant and uninhibited. And the rest is history.

What is happening in Thai politics is the struggle between reformists seeking positive political development and resisters bent on keeping the status quo and a corrupt system. Even with the ousting of Thaksin by the military and plans to draft a new constitution, the outcome of this titanic struggle between reformists and corrupt elements remains uncertain.

Now we know that even the most idealistic constitution cannot stop corruption or military coups or strengthen democracy unless Thai people become effective citizens who are politically aware and reject the corruption-prone patronage system of relationships as a way of life.