These meetings were not made public or carried out in the open because the government did not officially sanction them. In most cases, they were initiated by the heads of various security agencies who were looking to build up their resumes in the hope that their efforts would somehow come in handy in advancing their careers.

On-again-off-again dialogues have been too sporadic and uncoordinated to produce any tangible or useful outcome.

There have been a couple of occasions when information was leaked to the media about meetings held between Thai officials and separatist leaders. Two years ago, an Army colonel was dispatched to meet with Bersatu leader, Dr Wan Kadir Che Man, in Sweden. The National Security Council (NSC) was planning to propose to Thaksin that the exiled Malay separatist leader be permitted to return to Thailand in the hope that this would be seen as a goodwill gesture that could help reconcile the differences between the Buddhist state and the Malay-speaking South. Men like Wan Kadir belong to a previous generation of separatist insurgents. He and his comrades do not share the same mindset, motivations and tactics of today's militants whose daily assassinations, roadside bombings and other terrorist tactics have driven a large wedge between the average Buddhist and Muslim in the region.

Despite the NSC's endorsement, the idea of allowing this previous generation of separatists to return to Thailand never took off. Thaksin rejected the idea. To him, the fact that they had challenged Thailand's concept of nation-state was a crime that could never be forgiven.

The fact that the government refused to distinguish between separatists from previous generations and today's militants reflects poorly on officials in the country's security community, who often dismiss such debate as too academic or irrelevant.

These people should be granted amnesty and allowed to come back to their home in the Muslim South. Obviously leaders of previous generations of Malay separatist groups who have given up armed struggle against the Thai state will have much to offer regarding reconciliation between southern Muslim Malays and the rest of society. It also obvious that there is no better gesture of goodwill with which to launch reconciliation. For the time being, however, the government must redouble its efforts to get the situation in the deep South under control.

In the absence of effective military strategies and tactics, they sit helplessly watching the militants raising the political stakes, doing economic damage, and undermining social cohesion - not to mention the human cost to the local population forced to bear the brunt of the ongoing violence.

Their inability to restore any semblance of law and order makes security agencies' attempts to win the hearts and minds of local Malays look desperate and amateurish. Why should local Malays trust the authorities and cooperate with them if they know that by doing so they could become targeted by insurgents for intimidation or assassination?

Obviously, government officials cannot be expected to negotiate with Islamic militants-Malay separatists while they are under fire. What the state has to make clear is that potential partners in any peace talks must first lay down their arms and make clear that they share a common destiny with the rest of the Kingdom.

In the meantime, any hopes for a sustainable peace in this strife-torn region hinges on the authorities re-establishing the rule of law in the region. Once that is established, it must be followed by a well-thought-out campaign to win sufficient public trust on which to build a better future based on respect for cultural and religious diversity and peaceful coexistence.