The first version goes like this.

In the colonial era, Siam's old elite cooperated cleverly with foreign powers. As a result, Siam got the worst of both worlds. The economy fell under foreign domination, while political power remained in the hands of a tiny elite.

A movement arose that questioned why Siam remained poor and backward, even compared to neighbouring countries under colonial rule. This movement argued that the old elite was "farming on the backs of the people".

Those who benefited were the old families and the colonial firms. In 1932, this movement was able to overthrow the absolute monarchy. The new leaders brought in a constitution and parliament, rewrote the treaties that submitted Siam to colonial economic domination, and began work on social and economic development.

But the task was hampered by fears of a counter-revolution by the royalist-colonialist rearguard that had benefited under the old regime. The new leaders hesitated over pressing ahead with democratisation.

Military officers took this opportunity to seize power. At first, their domination was rather shaky. But that changed after the US selected Thailand as a base during the Cold War. The Americans provided military rulers with funding, arms, and strong external support. The result was 50 years in which the military dominated Thai politics in varying ways. For most of this time, the people had no political rights, and free debate was suppressed.

The US also promoted the growth of a capitalist economy, which created a new and powerful class of big businessmen.

This military domination was overthrown by a popular movement that was initially led by students but supported by a large swathe of the population. There were leaders, such as Pridi Banomyong and Thirayuth Boonmee, who had a strong belief in democracy. The media played a key role in promoting democratic ideas. The businessmen gave guarded support to democratisation in the hope it would lead to more liberal policies.

Military rule was undermined through a series of political crises that brought massive numbers of people onto the streets in political demonstrations. The democracy movement used the strategy of writing constitutions to whittle back the power of the military.

By the 1990s, there was a functioning parliamentary democracy in place, but it still had many problems. Politics and business were too closely intertwined. Money dominated. The rural mass of the population still seemed poorly integrated into the democratic system. Perhaps this was because the history of Thailand's democracy had been very much an urban story in which the countryside had only a peripheral role.

The second version of the history of Thailand's democracy is very different. It also starts back in the colonial period, and goes like this. Siam avoided colonisation because the old elite took the lead in modernising the country. There was no demand for democratisation because this modernisation was so successful. By 1930, the old elite was preparing to grant a constitution and move towards parliamentary rule, but this plan was disrupted by the 1932 coup.

Even though the coup was only the work of a hundred or so impatient adventurers, King Rama VII had the good sense to cooperate in order to avoid conflict and bloodshed. He granted a constitution. But this cooperation eventually broke down because the new leaders were power-hungry and self-interested. The king abdicated, proving that he was more democratic in spirit than his opponents. Politics were taken over by gangs of generals and business cronies, who fought over the spoils of power for the next 50 years. Parliaments were set up, constitutions written, and elections held, but these did not really work.

Thailand is unique and such foreign imports do not suit the local culture. Underneath this institutional veneer, politics was a crude battle for power and profit. His Majesty the King carved out a special role in this unstable environment.

The monarch's ability to intervene is limited because he is above politics and must always conform to the Constitution. But he acts as a moral force countering the self-interest of politicians, and is able to play a role in defusing crises when all other mechanisms fail.

These histories are so contrary that they could come from two different countries. In one, the old elite outwits colonialism and pioneers modernisation. In the other, the old elite allies with colonialism and keeps the country from progressing. In one, democracy is something granted from above and constantly overseen. In the other, democracy is achieved by people asserting themselves against old power holders. In one, people remain essentially subjects. In the other, they become citizens.

In one, constitutions are foreign imports that fail. In the other, they are spearheads of change for the better. In one, Thailand is unique. In the other, it is not really different from many other countries.

In the context of the second history, the current crisis is nothing new or surprising. Thai politics has been going astray ever since the country lurched towards constitutional democracy in 1932. This is just another in an inevitable series of crises that have to be overcome.

But in the context of the first history, the current crisis is much more complex and potentially tragic. The constitution of 1997, vaunted as the most democratic ever, delivered power into the hands of the least democratic leader of recent years. Attempts to remove him because of his abuse of democracy have utilised both media pressure and street demonstrations, which were the tools of the democracy movement in the past. But these have given him the chance to portray himself as a defender of democracy. All the wires have become crossed, and there is a real danger that the lessons of this version of the history are getting lost in the static.

Chang Noi