General Pornchai Kranlert, position: Assistant Army Commander-in-chief

Although no one wants to see it happen, the possibility of a military showdown to settle one of the biggest political conflicts in modern Thai history has risen above the "taboo" line. For one thing, Thai politics and the role of the military have been interwoven ever since the 1932 bloodless coup to move from absolute monarchy to democratic rule.

The Kingdom has seen a number of coups, counter-coups and failed attempts to usurp power. Unique in Thai history is that such military intervention can work both ways - to overthrow an elected government or to enable a leader to cling to power.

Since the 1980s, the military has learnt a valuable lesson, with many coup attempts either defeated or forced to abort. The armed forces were not so invincible when faced with the opposition of the people.

When everyone thought the military take-over was a thing of the past, a clique of Chulachomklao Class 5 graduates managed to overthrow the Chatichai Choonhavan government in 1990. This was the last successful coup to date.

A coup of another kind, one staged by the government, has a perfect record of success. In November 1971, the Thanom Kittikhachorn government overthrew itself in order to shut down Parliament and rule by military might.

After the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, which came into existence following political reforms triggered by the 1992 bloodshed, soldiers kept to their barracks and stopped meddling in politics.

When the Thaksin Shinawatra administration came to power in 2001, democracy was in full bloom. But a subtle gesture took place: Thaksin's former classmates from the Pre-Cadet Class 10 lined up to present the prime minister with a gift of a gold necklace with an amulet.

The gift had to be returned because of a cap on the value of gifts a prime minister can receive, though not before sending out its message loud and clear. The game of dispensing military appointments in exchange for backing the government had resumed once again.

In Thaksin's first term, his former classmates filled many key positions in the armed forces. This coincided with speculation that military officers had to secure his blessing if they wanted to advance their careers.

For the past five years, Thaksin has rigorously denied - but failed to dispel doubts - that he meddled in the annual military reshuffles.

The Pre-Cadet Class 10 and officers seen as close to the Thai Rak Thai Party were placed on the fast-track for promotion, although they did not dominate the combat forces like the old cliques from Chulachomklao Class 5 and Class 7 in the 1980s.

The bottom line was that Thaksin managed to place his military allies in such a way as to ensure his bargaining leverage, but not strongly enough to upset the balance of power in the armed forces, which might have backfired against his government.

After Thaksin won his second term last year, the opposition to his leadership began to gain momentum. In September, he went out of his way to override the list of military rotations drawn up by the Defence Council and pushed for his favourite officers.

In an unprecedented incident, the royal command for the annual reshuffle was stalled until the government amended some key appointments.

Following a compromise, Air Chief Marshal Chalit Pukbhasuk was the dark horse who secured the position of Air Force commander-in-chief.

Thaksin won a consolation prize with the appointment of his former classmate ACM Sukamphon Suwanthat as Air Force chief of staff.

He also had his way in naming Admiral Satirapan Keyanon as Navy commander-in-chief.

At the armed forces' helm, General Ruengroj Mahasaranont was promoted to the position of supreme commander after being handpicked by his predecessor, Gen Chaisit Shinawatra, who is Thaksin's cousin.

Thaksin engineered subtle changes in the Army to ensure the upper hand without attracting too much attention to his meddling.

He promoted Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin to the position of the Army commander-in-chief. Sonthi, a career soldier with a low profile, got his due reward based on merit. This top appointment helped to lessen the visibility of appointments to lesser but crucial posts.

Gen Pornchai Kranlert became the assistant Army commander while Lt-General Anupong Paochinda was elevated as commander of the 1st Army Region. Maj-General Prin Suwanthat filled the position of commander of the 1st Infantry Division.

All former classmates of Thaksin, Pornchai, Anupong and Prin occupy three combat positions proven to be indispensable in any military intervention. The three are seen as staunch allies of the embattled prime minister.

If and when a coup happens, either for or against Thaksin, the stand this trio takes will prove decisive to the outcome.

Pornchai is an artillery officer and has influence over the Army Air Defence Command, including its Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division. This division has a track record of staging both coups and counter-coups.

At the height of the street protests in February, Sonthi abruptly deployed his guards from the special warfare units in Lop Buri, replacing those from the artillery units.

It is noteworthy that Sonthi openly opposed the enforcement of a state of emergency while Pornchai kept mum on the matter. This power play occurred after Thaksin had made it known that he was ready to quell the protests by any means deemed necessary.

Anupong is an infantry officer with deep ties to infantry units in Bangkok as well as crack troops from the Queen's Guard of the 21st Infantry Regiment in Chon Buri.

Prin is from the infantry corps with extensive contacts with the military police from Army Circle 11 with jurisdiction over the capital.

In his present position, he also has the 4th Cavalry Battalion to dispatch armoured vehicles to secure Bangkok's strategic areas.

Last year, he spearheaded a veiled threat of military intervention in a bid to stop street protests organised by anti-Thaksin campaigner Sondhi Limthongkul.

The three Thaksin allies have a decisive say on infantry, artillery and cavalry units that would be needed to seize the capital.

As for other allies, Ruengroj could play a decisive role in securing communications and broadcast channels. Sukamphon could ensure aerial domination, while Satirapan would ensure Thaksin's safety because his house is located within naval jurisdiction.

Despite of the apparent advantage of Thaksin's Pre-Cadet Class 10 officers, the outcome of a military intervention is far from certain. This is because his allies do not have firm support from battalion commanders like in past coups.

Should the military card be played to end the political crisis, Thaksin's supporters and his opponents might not need to stage an outright coup.

For the government camp, military intervention may be deemed necessary only to the extent of allowing Thaksin to overcome political hurdles and contest the new election.

The opposition may have even less need for a coup as Thaksin could be removed from the scene by judicial due process.

The military intervention is likely to be more a show of force via unit mobilisations to force the other side to back down.

Thaksin's allies are expected make the first move to keep the government in power if the prime minister is faced with political demise. And a counter-move, if carried out in haste, might be the trigger to send the situation spiralling out of control.