The last thought that crossed her mind while being repeatedly beaten and kicked by her merciless captors must have been one of hopelessness on realising that no one would come to her rescue in her most desperate hour of need.

The armed forces once again brought shame upon themselves with their unsoldier-like vacillation and, perhaps, even cowardice, in a hostage situation that called for decisive leadership, prompt action and even the ultimate sacrifice, if it came to that.

Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratklin had to publicly express deep regret and apologise to the families of Juling and the other teacher assaulted for the Fourth Army's failure to rescue them, as the Army had ample time and manpower to conduct a rescue operation during the teachers' two-hour ordeal.

Rescuing hostages held by a mostly unarmed mob should not be too difficult a task for a small, well-trained Army unit to carry out with minimal or no casualties. It is disturbing to learn that a sizeable Army patrol unit was on standby in the proximity of the school where the two teachers were held and tortured. They waited, doing nothing, for instructions from higher-ups that never came and the requested reinforcement from a nearby Army installation that took two hours to travel a distance that should have taken them half an hour. By the time they arrived the mob had dispersed after beating Juling and her colleague, who sustained less serious injuries.

It is shocking to learn that even at this advanced stage in the fight against Islamic militants/separatist insurgents in the deep South, which covers predominantly Muslim Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces, the Fourth Army continues to be weighed down by weak leadership, incompetence, poor morale and lack of preparedness to deal with emergencies like hostage situations, let alone the readiness or the will to engage insurgents.

It may well be true that the reluctance to use force even in hostage situations, where it is justifiable in a rescue attempt, has something to do with the atrocity committed by the Fourth Army in which 78 Muslim protesters died of suffocation after being tied up and crammed into crowded transport vehicles. The Army has yet to be brought to account for the incident, which took place in October 2004 following a riot in Narathiwat's Tak Bai district. Instead of being haunted by this past mistake, the Fourth Army must own up to it and punish the personnel responsible for the brutality so that it can turn over a new leaf and become an effective professional fighting force that strictly adheres to respect for human rights.

But there are plenty of lessons that the Fourth Army commanders, whose responsibility it is to combat Islamic insurgents in the deep South, could have learned but obviously have not.

After all, the current war between the government and Islamic insurgents that has killed more than 1,000 people in the past two years was sparked by a daring raid in January 2004 on an Army installation of battalion strength by almost 100 insurgents. The battalion was overrun, four soldiers were killed and the arms depot ransacked. The insurgents got away with hundreds of automatic rifles.

The position of Fourth Army commander has changed hands three times since then - a span of less than two-and-a-half years. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has kept former and current Fourth Army commanders on a short leash, which explains why, instead of being allowed to discharge their duties in a professional manner, they must always wait for instructions from their political masters at Government House. Without a thorough revamp of the Fourth Army leadership and dramatic improvement in its battle readiness, the Army will be fighting a losing war against the Islamic insurgents.