Obviously Washington's decision-makers are reluctant to admit that their new policy is aimed at winning Asean support to countervail China's growing influence in the region. China's current friendship with Asean is the outcome the charm offensive it started over a decade ago, after the Mischief Reef incident of 1995.

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice failed to attend the Asean Regional Forum last August, the group's leaders interpreted it as a sign of US disinterest. Washington argued that her deputy, Robert Zoellick, an old Asia hand, was a more suitable representative. The US learned the hard way that when it came to formality and face, Asean could be vicious.

As a confidence-building measure, the US has confirmed early that Rice will be at the Asean foreign ministers' meeting on July 26-28 in Kuala Lumpur. Its diplomats are preparing for her trip, trying to ensure it is a special one.

Meanwhile Washington is fine-tuning a three-pronged policy focused on strengthening cooperation with Asean on political and security issues, in trade and investment, and in social and cultural areas.

This comprehensive approach is aimed at broadening the US position in Southeast Asia and countering what the administration perceives as the marginalisation of its role in the region and the rise of anti-Americanism.

During the second Bush administration, Washington acknowledged that the only way to stay relevant to Asia was to engage and connect with Asean. To do so it must be willing to accommodate some of the grouping's peculiar rationale. Yet while the tone of discourse and rhetoric has changed, the substance has not.

From the US perspective, despite Asean's reputation being tarnished by the admission of Burma in 1997, its lack of political framework and a dismal record in conflict resolution and crisis management, it is still a pivotal and indispensable organisation for peace and stability in the region. With the ongoing tension in Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties, Asean remains a necessary buffer for the two Asian superpowers.

At issue here is how far the US is prepared to go in wooing Asean. Will it engage Asean at the same level and in the same manner that China has done for years? Some dramatic shift in policy can be expected.

Some US scholars and retired policy-makers recently discussed the possibility of the country's accession to the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a precursor to better ties. They said the US could sign (but not ratify) the treaty for now, to show its genuine desire to coexist voluntarily with the regional code of conduct, which denounces the use of force and political interference.

Past signatories of the TAC have enjoyed better trust and relations with Asean. The group first approached the US and other major powers to accede to the TAC in 1992, but without any response. China and India started a domino effect by signing up two years ago, since when Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand have followed suit. France has said that it too would like to join the TAC.

Such a move by the US would give it a level playing field with China in Southeast Asia, but even without it the US will continue to strengthen its rapport with Asean leaders at the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) meeting. In Busan last November Bush met the leaders of the seven Asean members and signed a joint declaration of enhanced partnership. Since then relations have improved markedly as both sides work on their aspirations.

Discussions are now under way to fix up meetings for Bush with all Asean leaders at the upcoming Apec meeting in Hanoi. Both the Laotian and Cambodian leaders will be invited to Hanoi for this special occasion, but Burma's participation remains problematic, as manifested by the outcome of the Asean foreign ministers' retreat on Bali last week.

More than US officials are willing to admit, their country has benefited from China's experience in turning foes into friends through supportive roles in Asean initiatives and policies. This approach has quickly earned China the highest level of trust from Asean. Over their 15 years of relations, China and Asean have developed the most comprehensive ties with 48 mechanisms to manage their growing cooperation. They plan to celebrate the occasion in the Chinese city of Nanning in October.

On the other hand, after nearly three decades of friendship there is still no institutionalised Asean Plus One meeting with the US. Only seven mechanisms have been established to manage US-Asean cooperation. They will commemorate their 30th anniversary with a summit, if they can overcome the Burma hurdle.

The US makes a strong political and security ally, but Asean must learn how to use this as its members are very diverse. The US must be more engaging to counter China's proactive political and security policy. Beijing has turned all Asean members into strategic partners with the signing of security-cooperation schemes. The US has only a few major non-Nato allies, including Asean members Thailand and the Philippines.

Cooperation against terrorism is another area in which the US would like to strengthen ties with intelligence exchange and civilian and military training. New areas will include nuclear non-proliferation and cooperation on marine security, which is considered sensitive in the region. Malaysia, which used to be hostile to US initiatives on maritime security, has since become more accommodating of the US and Asean's attitude in general.

In trade and investment, the US plans to promote a free-trade agreement (FTA) with Asean built upon bilateral negotiations with its members. Singapore was the first to conclude an FTA with the US. Thailand started negotiations last year, but the process has been stalled by political crisis. Malaysian-US FTA negotiations will begin soon.

The US will win more support in economic areas by facilitating trade and investment with those Asean members that are ready, because the conditions placed on US-Asean free trade so far have been its weakest spot.

Finally, the US will advocate using cultural and educational links to promote better understanding and cooperation with the younger generation in the region. This is a new approach from Washington, aimed at reducing the anti-Americanism that has been building up since the anti-terror campaign following 9/11 and heightened with the Iraq invasion.

The stakes are high for the US in its new policy towards the region, because this could give it more bargaining power with ascendant China, which has already become the main pillar of Asean's external relations and policies.

Kavi Chongkittavorn