First of all, dictators and potential dictators in Southeast Asia have good reason to be afraid, very afraid. What transpired in Thailand recently was a big triumph for non-violent political struggle, a siege of leaders and their cronies who refused to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Like many other major events in Thailand in past decades, the effects of this political phenomenon will probably reach across Thai borders to the entire region. The struggle between pro-democracy students and the military rulers in 1973 inspired the people's power movement in the Philippines that toppled dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.

Before that, it was Thailand that ignited the campaign against Japanese products that spread across the region from Bangkok to Manila to Jakarta.

Later, when the so-called "tom yum" disease hit the region in July 1997, it was caused by Thailand's economic excess and unaccountability. It led to a bigger and broader Asian financial crisis the effects of which are still being felt today. As a major economy located at a strategic crossroads on mainland Southeast Asia, what Thailand did and did not do would somehow affect the region and quite often morph into a regional phenomenon.

When business tycoon turned politician Thaksin came to power in early 2001, it was a breath of fresh air. After all, he was perceived as the new Asian leadership - business-minded, taking quick and decisive action. Coming in the wake of the economic crash, his business experience and get-rich-quick ideas really caught the attention of the debt-ridden rural and urban populations. When he started his maverick cash-pumping and tax-rebate schemes, both rural and city dwellers were immediately taken by his economic strategies.

But within the span of five years Thaksin had conquered everything inside Thailand, lawfully or unlawfully. Indeed, his greed and arrogance caused so much revulsion that they pushed the Thai people to leave their homes to protest. It was ridiculous and shameful of him to claim repeatedly that he respected the rule of law and principles of democracy. When he was at the zenith of his power, he ignored every rule of honest engagement and enriched himself and cronies in grotesque ways. He was so confident he had no idea that the Shin-Temasek deal would lead to his political demise.

It must be noted that Thaksin's behaviour is not unique in the region. Some Asean leaders have imitated his populist agenda and even improved on them. Philippine President Gloria Arroyo has been a big fan of Thaksin and has taken up some of his populist policies related to debt and loans. So has Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose popularity is partly attributed to his hands-on approach to the rural poor. In fact, Thaksin has regionalised the "Amway" political style of delivering political promises directly, cutting out bureaucrats or any form of middle man and ignoring the consequences and sustainability of such solutions.

When the rallies against Thaksin started in January, no one expected things to end as they have. Fear of violence was the main concern. No Thai would believe for a minute that the much-heralded non-violent resistance could work or be possible in a country that has gone through three events of major bloodshed. Worse, a culture of impunity and violence had become highly visible on the streets and in the bush - epitomised by the extra-judicial killings during the anti-drug campaign and including the conflict in southern Thailand.

That the civil disobedience movement led to Thaksin taking a political break is quite revolutionary. It's ripple effects could be felt both over the short and long term in neighbouring countries such as Burma, Cambodia and even Malaysia. Public protests by the middle class with intellectuals among their leaders, where families shout slogans and then patiently sit to hear government whistleblowers tell of abuse of power, corruption and nincompoops, could become a regional norm.

After Thaksin decided to step down Filipino politicians immediately called on Arroyo to resign as well. Without Thaksin's personalised and strong support of the Burmese junta the generals would have been weakened even in the secure environment of their new capital, Pyinmana. With strong international sentiment against the Rangoon regime and its brutality, the Burmese people might be able to show their courage again.

Whether the effects of Thailand's civil disobedience proliferate regionally will be seen sooner rather than later.

 Kavi Chongkittavorn