But such a scenario is unlikely to proceed smoothly should his Thai Rak Thai Party decide to pursue charter reform on its own, given the premier's dismal record of complying with the intent of the Constitution over the past five years.

Kanin Boonsuwan, a constitutional expert, has even suggested that the current charter, drafted and promulgated in 1997, has been hijacked by the executive branch during Thaksin's terms of office.

Abuses of the Constitution by exploiting loopholes and commandeering checks and balances over the past five years have meant that there have been two versions of the highest law in the land. The first was the original 1997 Constitution, once dubbed the People's Charter, while the second was an unwritten version of the first as interpreted and adopted by Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai by right of their majority rule in Parliament.

There is a clear pattern of events that show that the spirit of the charter has been abused. First, the interim Article 325, which governed the first general election held under the present Constitution in January 2001, waived Article 107 (4) - a clause that requires all MP candidates to belong to a political party for at least 90 days prior to a general election.

This waiver was intended to give more flexibility to MPs in the initial election, but it set the stage for a massive consolidation of power by the fledgling Thai Rak Thai Party.

Within a short period of time, Thai Rak Thai, which was then only a few years old, became the biggest party in Thailand's political history with a sizeable majority, even though the 2001 election was its first contest. The premier's majority rule quickly became more powerful after a series of mergers and acquisitions.

In face of the Constitution's intent to make it difficult for MPs to switch parties, Thaksin managed to expand his party immediately after the election by taking over smaller parties, namely Seritham, New Aspiration and Chat Pattana parties, and absorbing their MPs.

That quick TRT expansion was made legally possible by exploiting the loophole provided by Article 118 (9), which states that MPs who belong to political parties ordered closed by the Constitution Court may join other parties within 60 days. This effectively allowed dozens of MPs whose parties were acquired by Thai Rak Thai to retain their MP status by joining the new mega-party.

It was constitutionally permissible, but the acquisition and subsequent closure of the former parties was inconsistent with the intent of the Constitution. In other words, the 1997 charter was outsmarted from the outset, and Thai Rak Thai was poised for further abuses.

Second, Article 266 states that in the event of conflicts concerning the authority and duty of independent organisations set up under the Constitution, these organisations or the president of Parliament may recommend a solution to the Constitution Court.

But because Thai Rak Thai had already established domination in the House, the president of Parliament acted in favour of the executive branch. Subsequently the independence of watchdog bodies such as the Election Commission and National Counter Corruption Commission, which are supposed to serve as checks and balances on the government, was whittled away. The Senate also failed to act.

Third, the parliamentary system as enshrined under the Constitution was further impaired after the 2005 general election, which concluded with an overwhelming 375 MPs out of the total 500 belonging to Thai Rak Thai due to the party's popularity and earlier acquisitions. But the Constitution did not take the possibility of this overwhelming domination of the House by a single party into account, and as a result the opposition bloc was rendered ineffective as a check on government. Its 124 MPs fell short of the minimum 200 needed to censure the prime minister as enshrined in the Constitution.

Fourth, the Thaksin government over the course of five years has entered into several free-trade agreements with foreign nations without seeking prior approval from Parliament as required under Article 224 of the Constitution; again, independent bodies, the House and the Senate failed to act.

Fifth, the Thaksin government issued an executive decree declaring that the prime minister and one Cabinet member had the power to approve a Cabinet proposal on their own during a state of emergency. This violates the principle that the Cabinet should be accountable to Parliament and the House of Representatives as stated in Article 211 and Article 212. Thaksin got away with it again.

Sixth, the appointment of vice ministers during both Thaksin administrations was not sanctioned under the Constitution. These vice ministers were accountable neither to Parliament nor to the National Counter Corruption Commission as they were not required to declare their assets and liabilities before taking public office.

All of these examples show that the Thaksin administration has consistently and repetitively abused the Constitution, taking advantage of serious flaws in the charter that should be addressed by a non-partisan body of experts overseen by a "national" government consisting of the three opposition parties now boycotting the election as well as Thai Rak Thai. History has shown that Thaksin is anything but a proper steward for constitutional reform.

 Nophakhun Limsamarnphun

 nop1122@yahoo.com